Changes to US Payment System Risk Policy

The US Federal Reserve will implement changes to its Payment System Risk (PSR) policy in early 2011. The revised PSR policy explicitly recognizes the role of the central bank in providing intraday credit to healthy depository institutions predominantly through collateralized daylight overdrafts. The policy encourages institutions to pledge collateral to cover daylight overdrafts by providing collateralized daylight overdrafts at a zero fee and by raising the fee for uncollateralized daylight overdrafts to 50 basis points.

A specific implementation date will be announced at least 90 days in advance.

In anticipation of depository institutions' changing needs for collateral management under the revised policy, the Federal Reserve, in collaboration with the financial industry, has assessed and identified opportunities to improve System operational systems. The Reserve Banks have been implementing enhancements to their own operational systems and processes that will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of pledging, withdrawing, and monitoring collateral. Many of these operational improvements will be available to institutions on or before the implementation date of the PSR policy changes.

UK regulatory system set to change

The UK government has unveiled a shake-up of the countries system that will consolidate power within the Bank of England and eliminate the Financial Services Authority, long the main overseer of the nation's financial center, the City of London.

The new Conservative-led coalition government plans to splinter the FSA into three new agencies, including a bank-regulating subsidiary inside the Bank of England. The new regulatory approach was unveiled in a speech last Wednesday night in London by the UK's Treasury chief, George Osborne, who trumpeted "a new system of regulation that learns the lessons of the greatest banking crisis in our lifetime."

In the House of Parliament in London on Wednesday, George Osborne, trumpeted the 'new system of regulation.'

While more ambitious than expected, the structural changes are more functional than specific, leaving for a later date thorny questions over the appropriate structures of banks. The US is debating a range of rule changes that would impact the finance sector in much more extensive ways than Mr. Osborne's proposals. The European Union is pushing its own policies, including new oversight for hedge funds.

Forced to forge a coalition with the Liberal Democrats after a tight election, the Conservatives were expected to move more deliberately on their pledges of financial-system regulatory changes. But the Lib Dems are backing the government's attempt to make a clean break with a regulatory system tarred by the financial crisis, meaning that the changes are almost certain to come into effect.

At the heart of the proposed overhaul—which requires approval by Parliament and would be implemented by the end of 2012—is an empowered Bank of England. In addition to its current responsibility for monetary policy, the central bank will take charge of preventing systemic risks and of day-to-day supervision of the UK financial sector, including foreign companies that operate in the City of London, through a newly formed subsidiary, tentatively dubbed the Prudential Regulatory Authority.

The Bank of England's governor, Mervyn King, will become chairman of the expanded authority. He welcomed the changes as "the right direction of reform." He didn't address his past comments, specifically his argument that big banks should be broken up to separate risk-taking from utility banking, something the City has fiercely resisted.

The revamp has big implications for giant banks around the world, not just those headquartered in the UK. The FSA already has been getting tougher regulating overseas banks' London subsidiaries. The growing clout of Mr. King, who has talked openly of breaking up big banks, could subject the U.K. and foreign banks alike to more draconian oversight.

In the UK, the new agency within the Bank of England will inherit some of the powers of the FSA, which never fully recovered from its legacy of "light touch" regulation of London's financial community in the wake of the financial crisis. Further tarnishing the FSA in the eyes of many Tories, the previous Labour government established the agency in 1998 shortly after taking power, removing bank-regulatory oversight from the Bank of England.

While the FSA will cease to exist on paper, much of its current structure is likely to live on in the new prudential authority. Its supervisory staff is expected to remain largely intact, as is its newly muscular approach to policing banks, traders and insurers.

Even the agency's leader will be the same. The FSA's chief executive, Hector Sants, had announced plans to retire this summer, but Mr. Osborne persuaded him to take the helm of the new agency for three years. Mr. Sants will become a deputy governor of the Bank of England.

A restructuring will eliminate the UK's Financial Services Authority. Two of the FSA's other duties—consumer protection and law enforcement—will be assumed by new independent entities, including an agency focused on white-collar crime.

In addition to fulfilling a Conservative campaign pledge, the revamp of the regulatory system is intended to bring bank supervision under one roof at the central bank. The Tories blame a disjointed approach, in which officials from different agencies didn't coordinate with each other, for allowing the banking system to grow bloated with debt and for impeding the government's response when the crisis hit.

"Because central banks are the lenders of last resort ... they need to be familiar with every aspect of the institutions that they may have to support," Mr. Osborne said in Wednesday's speech, at a black-tie dinner attended by London's financial elite.

The new structure doesn't include a spot for the FSA's well-regarded chairman, Adair Turner, who is expected to remain at the FSA during a two-year transition. Lord Turner endorsed the shake-up Wednesday, saying it resolves the uncertainty surrounding the agency.

The planned overhaul is the product of weeks of negotiations and horse-trading that highlights the delicate nature of the coalition government. In order to win over Vince Cable, the Liberal Democratic business secretary who had opposed abolishing the FSA, Mr. Osborne let him pick at least two of the five members of a high-profile committee charged with making recommendations about the structure of the UK banking industry, according to a person familiar with the matter.

The proposed revamp is likely to prove controversial.

Some experts have said it risks distracting the Bank of England from its paramount role of setting monetary policy and controlling inflation at a particularly crucial time for the UK's struggling economy.

Mr. Sants himself was critical of the Conservatives' proposal to fold the FSA into the Bank of England. "There remains the possibility of tougher times to come for those we regulate," he said in a speech in November. "Now is not the time, therefore, to be diverting resource to looking at structural questions."

Bringing the FSA's supervisory infrastructure under the Bank of England's roof is likely to be especially tricky because of the two organizations' cultural differences.

For example, past and present officials at both organizations say the FSA tends to pay employees up to 50% more than the Bank of England. Senior FSA bank supervisors can pocket more than £300,000 ($444,000) annually, and the agency sometimes doles out lucrative bonuses. Mr. Sants received total compensation of £742,011 last year, more than double the £305,764 that Mr. King took home.

The FSA has argued that to police banks effectively, it needs to lure talent from them, which requires competitive pay packages. A lesser-paid civil-service culture pervades at the Bank of England.

Financial Innovation, Technology, Regulation and Public Policy

As the recent financial crisis begins to fade from memory we are starting to see behaviors in the world of financial innovation reverting to old methods and practices. Is it a good thing? Perhaps…

However, misunderstood financial innovations such as securitization, which led to the financial crisis through the sub-prime debacle in the United States, pose an ever present danger to the financial industry. Regulators and supervisors everywhere, as guardians of the various components of the world’s financial system, do still not clearly understand the implications of financial innovation. Often too this is clouded by public policies which as the basis for such oversight are suspect as to which “public” they are intended to benefit. This is especially the case in the uses of technology in the provision of financial services.
The word “innovate” means to bring in novelties or to make changes. Financial innovation extends this simple definition to the financial world. However, here the simplicity ends with a plethora of products, processes and methods that have been applied to the spectrum of the financial world – some good and some bad.

What drives financial innovation? Simply put – self interest, which finds expression through Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”. Financial institutions seek out, through the innovative process, the most efficient cost effective way to maximise their profits either on existing products or potential new ones.

There are two basic drivers of financial innovation which result from the barriers that a bank faces in reaching its financial goals – competition and regulation. To beat these barriers banks engage in completion of two sorts – competitive or circumventive. The first is pretty obvious as all banks seek to maximise their profits and they do this by competing with other players in the market.

The second, circumventive, is a little bit more obscure. In all jurisdictions financial firms are faced by a plethora of rules and regulations, imposed by the banking and regulatory authorities on how they conduct their business. These are the regulatory barriers that a bank faces. These barriers may often be overcome by innovation – hence the term “circumventive innovation”.

The classic illustration of this is the development of the humble Automated Telling Machine (ATM) which was introduced first in the United States as a circumventive innovation, to get past retractions on branch banking. The idea was quickly picked up, first in Europe, and then globally as a competitive innovation.  European banks had no restrictions on the number of branches they could have but labour policies created limitations on for example working hours among many other issues.  In the ATM the European banks found a new “staff member” who (1) was cheaper than a human teller, (2) could work all day and night, (3) was accurate, (4) did not need a physical branch to support it. There were many other plusses a well, not to mention the ability to widely expand the range of products and services that could be offered.

In essence, one type of innovation (circumventive) morphed into another (competitive). This interaction goes on constantly and is a key feature of the dynamics of a constantly evolving financial system. And technology has been a leading driver of this process. We see this in action all the time in many different ways.

Recently I came across a news item that indicated that Citibank had embarked on a project to make deep inroads to consumer banking in India – a vast market. Notwithstanding the size of the market in India, which is on a par with that of China, anyone trying to establish or expand their business in the world’s largest democracy has a massive hurdle to overcome. For a bank one of these hurdles is very tight regulation and the restrictions placed on banks in growing their branch networks.
The Reserve Bank of India, which is the country’s central bank, tightly controls the number of new branch licenses that are granted to foreign banks. This has a massive restrictive affect on the ability of such banks to grow their distribution networks.

To get past this limit on its physical presence Citibank has begun targeting India’s almost six hundred million mobile users. Now this is the “circumventive innovation” that I spoke of.

Citibank, who is one of the leading foreign banks in India with 42 branches and more than 450 ATMs – recently completed a six-month program in Bangalore to test the appetite of customers to make transactions through phones. The program was called the “Tap and Pay” pilot project.

During the project, the bank sold more than 3,000 phones especially enabled to make transactions over the mobile network. Customers made Rs26m (US$585,000) of purchases from 250 merchants. Citibank is now considering rolling out such services to its wider client base.

This case is a classic illustration of how financial innovations can be used an adapted to achieve other needs.

So, what is the message to bank regulators, supervisors and their policy makers? Well put simply “financial innovation or its implications are not always clearly understood”. These facts are critical to bank supervisors and regulators because innovative actions on behalf of the financial industry are not always benign or made for the general good. Equally so, public policy makers need to understand why some financial innovations take place and review their policies in the light of this. Very often restrictive practices are created for the wrong reasons – protection against genuine competition is often disguised as consumer protection.